Unfortunately, the measurement of the effects of wage-price control policies differs from that for monetary or fiscal policies for two basic reasons. First, parameters that measure the effect of money on spending can be estimated from historical periods during which the money supply varied, but parameters for the effect of controls on prices cannot be measured if controls were not applied during the sample period of the econometric model. Second, and more important in principle, even if controls were applied during the sample period-for example, the Kennedy-Johnson guideposts of 1962-66-there is no quantitative measure of the "toughness" or pervasiveness of one control episode as compared to another, and thus no way to quantify the "policy input" in 1971-73 as compared with the earlier episode.
For this reason econometric estimates of the effects of controls cannot be based on dynamic multipliers, but rather require a comparison of actual price or wage change (yt) tive variable-coefficient equation indicated a greater inflation in the absence of controls than did the fixed-coefficient version. Those who disagree with the specification of a given model can in general determine whether the proposed change increases or reduces the estimated effect of controls; in this particular case the alternative specification indicates that the basic equation understates the effect.
2. Sometimes misspecification cannot be avoided if a variable that is assumed a priori to influence prices or wages exhibits little variance in the sample period, thus preventing the estimation of a statistically significant coefficient. An example is the effect on nonfarm prices of changes in import prices, for which I was unable to obtain significant coefficients in my original paper because divergences between the two were relatively minor before 1971.6 (As I argue below, prices in the other exogenous sector, agriculture, would not be assumed a priori to influence nonfarm prices.)
The importance of this omission is obvious in 1973, when import prices rose much faster than nonfarm prices. If the a priori coefficient on these prices is positive, then in the absence of controls nonfarm prices would have risen more rapidly than the simulated values (st), and the effect of the controls would be understated. This effect is mitigated to the extent that the spillover of demand from controlled goods caused the import inflation, but I am convinced that the successive devaluations that were primarily responsible would probably have come earlier without controls. yield successively higher point estimates of this coefficient; thus the true value of the coefficient after 1971 without controls was more likely to have been at the high than the low end of the sample period confidence interval.7 4. Variables taken as exogenous, the x, in equation (4) above, may in fact be influenced by controls. In my 1972 paper the effects of controls were estimated on the assumption that unemployment rates and the excess demand for commodities were unaffected by controls, involving the implicit assumption of "a monetary and fiscal policy sufficiently accommodating to have allowed nominal gross national product to grow faster in the absence of controls by the estimated effect of the controls."8 Others may prefer to take monetary and fiscal policy and nominal income as exogenous, and compute the simulations for the unemployment rates and excess demand for commodities that would have accompanied that fixed nominal income. One would have expected the second set of assumptions to have produced a lower hypothetical rate of inflation, since the alternative simulation is based on higher unemployment rates; but in fact the model generates a Phillips curve that is sufficiently horizontal in the very short run to yield identical inflation predictions for very different unemployment rates.9 In a longer simulation, for more than a single year, one would expect the alternative exogeneity assumptions to produce results that diverge by a greater amount.
5. The measurement error (et) in equation (4) may be important if controls by themselves cause distortions in price measurement. To the extent that controls are binding and are accompanied by rationing, there is some vector of shadow prices (pt) at which the rationed quantities would be the preferred, utility-maximizing amounts of those goods.10 In this welfare sense, the "true" nonfarm price deflator that is relevant for individual utility functions is then a weighted average of actual prices for uncontrolled goods and the shadow prices of controlled goods; such a price concept rises during a control period relative to the actual nonfarm deflator. Thus to the extent that rationing is important, the use of the actual deflator overstates real income in the welfare sense and hence overstates the "true" rate of price increase. Since reports of shortages and rationing were rare during the 1971-72 period of concern in my earlier paper, I doubt that this problem has a significant effect on its results. However, it clearly has become more important in recent months. Another variety of measurement problem concerns the differing evaluations of controls implied by the nonfarm price index (used in my study) and the consumer price index (used by the Wall Street Journal, Feige and Pearce, and McGuire). Since the latter differs mainly in applying positive rather than zero weights to farm prices and mortgage interest rates, one must decide whether the behavior of these prices was exogenous or altered by the controls. Since I believe in their exogeneity during this interval, I feel that use of the CPI confuses the effect of controls with the exogenous disturbances which by coincidence happened partially or completely to offset the impact of controls."
Alternative Counterfactual Simulations for 1971-73
The results of the simulations are displayed in Table 1 . Actual and simulated values are compared for the annual rate of change, during each quarter between 1971:3 and 1973:3, of the nonfarm fixed-weight wage index, the nonfarm fixed-weight deflator, and the ratio of price to unit labor cost. In the case of wages the actual values are displayed in column (1), the results of a full dynamic simulation of my "basic" wage and price equations in column (2), and the difference between the two in column (3).12 The same information for prices is contained in columns (7), (8), and (9), and for the ratio of price to unit labor cost in columns (13), (14), and (15).
11. To justify use of the CPI, one would have to argue that the successive devaluations, the corn blight, the Russian wheat deal, and the Peruvian anchovy die-off, which contributed to the farm and import price inflation, were not exogenous forces but instead were caused directly by the controls.
12. The wage and price equations are from my 1972 paper, "Wage-Price Controls," 
Untangling the Effects of Import Prices
All of the simulations displayed in Table 1 The direct influence of import prices is also excluded from the nonfarm deflator by construction. But an acceleration of import price inflation may have an important positive indirect effect on the prices of import-competing goods in the nonfarm sector. For instance, the prices of small domestically produced automobiles that compete with imports increased at a much faster rate than those of large cars after the import "price umbrella" was lifted in the 1972-73 period. No precise a priori estimate of this effect is possible, because in the spectrum of substitution between foreign and domestic goods there is no unique cut-off point between goods that are perfect substitutes at one extreme and those with zero substitutability at the other. In addition, the indirect effect of higher import prices following a devaluation is not instantaneous but operates with a distributed lag.
15. This method is called "double deflation." The rate of change in the nonfarm private deflator is equal to the rate of change in the deflator for all private domestic production (including exports), minus the rates of change of farm and import prices, weighted by the respective current-dollar values of farm output and imports as a percentage of current-dollar private output.
16. William D. Nordhaus has performed some unpublished calculations, based on a fifty-eight-sector input-output table, which indicate that the inflation in wholesale food prices can be accounted for entirely by the direct effect of higher farm prices, with no additional impetus from higher profits or wages. On top of this, retail-wholesale margins may have been squeezed. Thus both the size of the ultimate effect and the lag pattern must be determined on empirical rather than theoretical grounds. My basic price equation has been refitted to allow import prices to influence nonfarm prices with a distributed lag, just as labor costs operate with a lag in the original basic equation.17 Table 2 illustrates the effects of the inflation of import prices on nonfarm prices in the first three quarters of 1973, and shows an average effect only slightly higher than in mid-1971. This raises the basic estimate of the 1973 price shortfall by about 0.3 percent.
The most important implication of Table 2 , however, is for the future. Even on the unrealistic assumption of zero change in import prices after 1973:3, the lagged effects of the import inflation that has already occurred imply an average of 0.8 percent extra inflation during the next four quarters, as compared with the outcome had import prices not accelerated in 1973.
The results of Table 2 should be regarded as suggestive rather than conclusive. The sum of the coefficients on import prices in the underlying price equation is quite unstable when the sample period is varied even by only a few quarters, although the shape of the lag distribution is quite stable. An alternative is available from Magee's calculations of import competitiveness at the four-digit industry level in manufacturing.18 According to these estimates, the sum of the coefficients of the import effect should be reduced from 0.13 to 0.052, and each figure in Table 2 consequently should be reduced by about 60 percent of its stated value. Furthermore, to the extent that the inflation in farm prices has temporarily reduced margins in the nonfarm sector, the "true" impact of higher prices of inputs to the nonfarm sector in 1973 may have been zero or slightly negative.19
Conclusions
The standard view of inflation in 1973 appears to require reconsideration, according to the major conclusions of this paper:
1. In comparison with the "basic" simulation of an econometric model fitted to the precontrol period, nonfarm prices rose at an annual rate that was about 2.3 percent slower than the simulated values during Phases I and II.20 None of this shortfall has been made up during Phases III and IV; on the contrary, nonfarm prices have fallen another 0.6 percent behind their simulated values. 2. While wages have risen less rapidly than in the no-controls simulation-at a rate of about 0.6 percent during Phases I and II and of about 1.1 percent in 1973-this has been due entirely to the indirect impact of slow price growth on wage behavior. Controls have had no direct effect on wages, given the actual behavior of prices.
3. Econometric estimates of the effects of controls are subject to a number of possible biases due to errors of specification, estimation, and measurement. One of these biases appears to point to an underestimate of the effect of controls reported in this paper: an alternative version of the wage equation with variable coefficients on past inflation yields a considerably larger estimated impact of the controls.
4. The simulations assume that real output and unemployment would have been the same with or without the controls. To the extent that nominal income is exogenous, unemployment would have been higher without the controls, and inflation would have been lower in the basic simulation. However, an alternative simulation, treating nominal income as exogenous, indicates that this source of bias is not potent enough to reverse the major conclusions of the paper.
5. In a controlled economy "true" prices-those that would be appropriate to measure real income in an economic welfare sense-are understated when controls are accompanied by rationing. In this sense, the simulations overstate the benefits of lower prices associated with controls to an unknown degree for the 1973 period, during which shortages of goods have been widely reported.
6. The evidence that the effects of import price inflation operate with a distributed lag indicates that at the end of 1973 there was a modest amount of extra inflation in the pipeline which will tend to cause prices to increase faster during 1974 than they would have otherwise.
7. Most important, the data that suggest that price controls checked inflation in the 1971-73 period are not clear evidence that the controls "succeeded." Controls worked not by moderating the behavior of wages relative to prices, but rather by squeezing profit margins sufficiently to hold prices below their free market levels. This is not a situation that can be expected to last indefinitely, and hence the very fact of short-run "success" for the control program guarantees its long-run failure. Only if factors other than the control program kept profit margins from exhibiting their usual cyclical rebound during 1971-72 can one expect that the profit squeeze will be maintained after the price controls are eliminated. If instead profit margins eventually return to their no-controls level, there will be a catch-up period after the controls are lifted during which the rate of inflation will be substantially faster than it would have been had the controls not been imposed. On the assumption that profit margins will eventually be reestablished, one can cite at least four reasons for concluding that the controls were a failure:
1. Controls will have had no long-run effect on inflation. William Nordhaus expressed his doubts about attributing a narrowing of profit margins to controls, since a squeeze on profits had been under way for several years before controls were imposed. Nordhaus also cited some research that he and John Shoven had done on recent price behavior. They found that, if prices of raw and basic commodities were taken as given, other prices were readily predicted, suggesting that there were no mysteries in the margins of manufacturers or distributors. Finally, Nordhaus suspected that Gordon's lags on import prices in Table 2 were too long, remarking that the British experience with the devaluation of the pound suggested that increases in import prices are passed through rapidly to other prices; food prices had responded fully within two months and all other prices within six months. William Branson offered the opinion that the appropriate weight for import prices in Gordon's overall price equation might be close to the weight of tradeable goods in total output, or roughly one-third, rather than the 13 percent used by Gordon.
Michael Wachter took issue with Gordon's standard for evaluating the effects of wage-price controls. Gordon had focused on the rate of increase of prices during recent quarters, whereas Wachter felt that the crucial consideration was the potential for future inflation. He remarked that government control policies should be judged successful only if they alleviated inflationary pressures in ways that would affect prices favorably even after controls were lifted. Gordon added his agreement and pointed to his concluding paragraphs, which emphasize the potential for future inflation in the recent suppression of profit margins.
Gardner Ackley inquired about the history of the equations used in Gordon's simulations. He wondered whether Gordon's equations might have an upward bias on prices insofar as they had been revamped to track the 1969-71 period. Price equations that explained the unique 1969-71 experience might overpredict the expected rate of price increase. Gordon felt that no important bias of that type was present since his sample period ended in 1970 and the price equation had displayed no instability in 1969-70. The instabilities of that period emerged in the behavior of wages.
George Perry suggested that a simple validation of Gordon's general results could be obtained by examining the difference between recent rates of increase in nonfarm prices and wages. He noted that nonfarm prices had risen at a rate of about 3 percent during the period of controls, while average hourly compensation had risen at 7 percent, a difference of roughly
